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The social world is not linear, but linear methods provide powerful and tractable forms of 
analysis for complex phenomena.  Using linear forms of analysis on social phenomena requires 
simplifying assumptions and the analysis hence only holds insofar as those assumptions can 
be defended.  In this, the social sciences differ little from natural sciences.  The non-linear 
equations that describe the swing of a pendulum can be accurately approximated and solved 
under ‘small angle’ conditions.   
Approximating a non-linear world with linear systems and linear forms of analysis is not 
unreasonable, but require careful attention to the limits of analysis and inference.  In many 
areas of social science, linear analysis has become a form of Kuhnian normal science, in which 
anomalies and problems are ‘explained away’ (e.g. heteroscadisticity-robust regressions, see 
below) or, if still intractable, put into a pile entitled ‘To Deal With – Later’.  Occasionally, 
scholars such as Andrew Abbott (2001) or Bent Flyvbjerg(2001) have taken a look at this pile 
and suggested that it is high enough to warrant paradigmatic reconsideration, but such efforts 
have often met with robust and angry denouncement from the methodological mainstream 
(Laitin, 2003; Stolzenberg, 2003). 
Abbott’s critique of the GLM has itself been subject to severe criticism. Notably, Stolzenberg 
(2003) delivers a trenchant attack that derides Abbott’s lack of statistical sophistication and 
his mischaracterisation (in Stolzenberg’s view) of quantitative sociologists as subscribing to a 
‘wooden-headed’ ontology. There are two separate issues at play here.  The first is whether 
modern statistical methods are indeed linear in their modelling of reality; the second is 
whether a commitment to these methods entails a commitment to a more generalized linear 
view of social reality.   
Stolzenberg and others are at pains to point out that modern statistical techniques are more 
than capable of handling non-linear relationships between variables; much of Stolzenberg’s 
critique is dedicated to detailing different ways in which this can be dealt with statistically, 
and the subsequent decade has seen further development of these technique.  True, 
Stolzenberg admits, the linear model requires linearity in its parameters but asserts 
parenthetically that this is an ‘entirely technical matter’.  We will return, passim, to quite how 
parenthetical this observation should be.   
The typical rejoinder to Abbott and Flyvbjerg’s style of critique is that quantitative social 
scientists aren’t nearly as naïve about statistical methods and their limitations as Abbott, 
Flyvbjerg and their ilk assert.  This view is put strongly by Stolzenberg, and also by Laitin (2003: 
p. 163) who characterizes Flyvbjerg and other ‘perestroikans’ as exhibiting an ‘abhorrence of 
all things mathematical… [that] reveals a fear of modern’. 1   Laitin, in turn, promotes a 
‘tripartite methodology’, in which statistical analysis is complemented by formal modeling and 
‘narrative’ techniques.  While in Laitin’s overall model, ‘narrative’ plays at best a supporting 
role – providing ‘plausibility test’ for formal models; identifying causal mechanisms; and, 
‘plant[ing] the seeds for future specification of variable’ – he does acknowledge that in 
 
1  The term ‘perestroikan’ refers to the disciplinary dispute within American political science 
ignited by a widely circulated attack on a perceived methodological intolerance within the 
American Political Science Association signed pseudonymously by ‘Mr Peterstroika’. 
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circumstances where statistical methods and formally modeling are unable to achieve 
significance, ‘narrative would need to stand alone’ (pp. 178-9). 
If we accept Laitin’s view then we have reason to be optimistic about the future of linear 
analysis as the sophistication of econometric techniques and the computer power to process 
these newer techniques progress rapidly.  Two decades ago, Abbott acknowledged that a 
range of newer methods, notably event analysis and other epidemiological and demographic 
techniques, deal precisely with some of his concerns, although viewed this as an insufficient 
rejoinder to the underlying problem.  Further statistical advances in the decades since Abbott 
published his critique have extended even further the sophistication of econometric methods, 
including multi-level models that allow for hierarchical nesting of observations with higher 
level fixed effects (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008) and advances to selection bias two-
stage models to include interaction effects (Brown and Mergoupis, 2011).  While these 
advances extend the range of contexts in which linear methods might be appropriately 
applied, however, they do not overcome the underlying problem identified by Abbott.  
But should we be so optimistic about the ability of ever-more advanced statistical methods to 
deal with an ever-wider range of contexts? It is notable that while Laitin acknowledges, at 
least in theory, that there are limits to the applicability of statistical methods, this is for him 
conceived of primarily in terms of statistical significance rather than epistemological 
appropriateness.  He notes that the failure to pass statistical tests may often be attributed to 
improper specification through models including ‘interactions, non-linearities, and so on’.  
Two points are worth making here.  First, this is another instance of the approach – misguided 
in our view – that sees epistemological non-linearity as an appropriate response to ontological 
non-linearity.  Secondly, his view of statistical significance as the ultimate arbiter of the 
applicability of statistical methods falls foul of Ziliak and McCloskey’s (2008) trenchant critique 
of the ‘cult of statistical significance’. 
Even if linearly-sympathetic methodologists such as Laitin and others are careful to identify in 
principle the limitations of linear methods in social science, the accusation thrown by critics 
is not necessarily that these limitations are not recognized in principle, but that they are not 
recognized in practice: the industry of quantitative social science continues, they assert, in 
ignoring these limits and applying their methods without critical attention to their 
appropriateness to the issue at hand.  In a contribution to the fiftieth anniversary edition of 
the highly ranked and highly quantitative Journal of Peace Research, Philip Schrodt (2014) lists 
a ‘monocultural’ obsession with linear methods in political science, describing a depressingly 
not-too-exaggerated homo signficantus who ‘year after year, grinds out articles by 
downloading a dataset, knocks out a paper or two over the weekend by running a variety of 
specifications until – as will invariably occur – some modestly interesting set of significant 
coefficients is found’.  Twenty years after Stolzenberg derided Abbott’s supposed caricature 
of ‘wooden-headed’ allegiance to linear methods in social science, Schrodt sees little 
improvement.  
Parenthetically, we could note that while Stolzenberg may be right that most practicing 
quantitative social scientists are not so simplistic about the ontology of social life as Abbott 
asserts, the percolation of their research and findings into policy and practice may often see 
such nuance and care stripped out in favour of simple (and simplistic) linear ‘findings’ that 
entail particular policy interventions.  In the international development industry, for instance, 
Rihani (2002) observes a dominant linear paradigm among development practitioners, but 
one that is an ‘assemblage of implicit assumptions that exert their influence in subtle ways’ 
rather than an explicit ontological commitment.   
At a more ontological level, Goldthorpe (2000) is concerned that this view mistakenly credits 
variable, or attributes, with causal efficacy.  Actors and their (social) actions, Goldthorpe 
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insists, are the main agents and vehicles for causal effect through ‘generative mechanisms’.  
A variable-based view of causality, from this perspective, does not provide us with any 
understanding of cause ‘deeper’ than the data themselves.  Goldthorpe, of course, is a strong 
advocate of the use of regression analysis of large datasets in the social sciences; his concern 
is not to discredit quantitative social science but to put it on a surer ontological footing.   
Goldthorpe’s approach turns the central role of regularity in analysis on its head.  
 
The Limits of Linearity in Practice 
We can sum up the position we have outlined thus far as follows: 
1. The social world is not linear but linear methods provide a powerful and appropriate 
approximation of non-linear reality under certain conditions; 
2. Recent (and, by extension, future) statistical advances expand the range of contexts 
under which linear forms of analysis might be appropriate but do not (and cannot) 
negate the broader epistemological point; 
3. Misguided caricatures on both parts aside, statements (1) and (2) are largely accepted 
in principle by both critics and defenders of the methodological mainstream; 
4. What remains contentious is how far, in practice, mainstream quantitative social 
sciences do pay careful critical attention to the limits of linearity;  
5. In part, the reason for (4) is because of the lack of methodological clarity over where 
the limits of linear analysis lie in social sciences. 
The remainder of this paper is directed towards (5).  We lay out three conditions that should 
be uncontroversial for limiting the contexts in which linear analysis may be appropriate and 
discuss ways in which we might pragmatically ascertain whether particular investigations 
conform to these conditions or not.  We should note, however, that we do not see these three 
conditions as the end of the story; there may be other conditions for linear analysis of social 
reality that we have not addressed: our conditions are necessary for linear analysis, but not 
necessarily sufficient.  Crucially, we want to argue that many of these techniques are available 
within the quantitative repertoire on methods and techniques, but that the methods available 
are often employed to ‘explain way’ non-linearity rather than to delimit linear analysis.  Ours 
is hence not an attack on quantitative epistemology from ‘outside’, but a contribution to 
refining quantitative practice from the ‘inside’.   
The three conditions we identify are: 
A. Homogeneity of effects, which can be broken down into homogeneity of entities 
and homogeneity of parameters; 
B. Insignificantly interacting entities; 
C. Stable and closed context. 
A. Homogeneity of Effects 
It is an obvious but important point that econometric methods require observations: rows of 
data.  These observations are characterized by different levels of attributes (variables): the 
data columns.  Observations might have other unobserved (and potentially unobservable) 
characteristics, which are captured under the individual error term.  But beyond this, the 
entities that constitute our observations must be homogenous; they must be of the same 
‘type’. Put in Aristotlean terms, statistical observations may vary in their attributes but must 
be of the same substance.  This assumption has been the subject of a range of criticisms from 
quantitatively- and qualitatively-inclined scholars alike.  Andrew Abbott (1988) characterizes 
and rejects this as a view in which ‘entities are fixed; attributes can change’.  Entities, 
according to Abbott, can and do vary and mutate over time with important consequences.  
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When working with individual-level microdata, the assumption of entity homogeneity and 
stability may seem plausible enough; as long as we capture sufficient attributes – age, gender, 
education, and so forth – on the individual level, what remains is the human ‘substance’ that 
is indistinguishable across individuals.  Statistically, there may be individual perturbations, but 
these are randomly distributed.  But what if we are dealing with more complex entities like 
companies, or countries.  Is it really plausible to assert that we can ever claim to characterize 
countries as of homogenous ‘substance’, no matter how much information we collect on their 
different ‘attributes’? What are the limits of what we define as a country?  We might take UN 
membership as a defining feature, but this rules out Taiwan, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Western Sahara, Kosovo, to name but a few political entities with varying degrees 
of autonomous statehood.  Moreover – and we return to this issue in section B below – the 
reason these entities are of disputed ‘countryness’ is itself heavily political; the status of 
Taiwan as a non-member of the UN is due to the contending geographical claims of Taiwan 
and the People’s Republic of China and the relative geopolitical strength of the latter.   
We might accept these problems but suggest that they are marginal; relative vagueness at the 
edges of our definition of entities does not affect the underlying relationships we seek to 
identify and test with linear methods.  We might even test for them by running alternative 
models with different definitions and comparing our estimates.  For instance, in considering 
the impact of ethnic polarization on the duration of civil wars, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 
(2007) note the range of different definitions of civil war extant in the quantitative literature 
and test their results on two different definitions that are characterized by different fatality 
thresholds.  In our example here, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol claim to find consistent results 
between the two definitions but, in doing so, they fall foul of Ziliak and McCloskey’s critique 
of significance obsession.  The two models do indeed show similar levels of statistical 
significance, but markedly different coefficient sizes: the coefficient on ethnic polarization in 
their most extensive model varies by a factor of four between the two definitions.  Short of 
confirming the ‘robustness’ of their findings, we would suggest that this points towards the 
second part of the homogeneity problem: homogeneity of parameter effects.   
In this respect, Brock and Durlauf (2001a; 2001b) provide a useful contribution towards 
thinking about the role of homogeneity in ascertaining the limits of linear methods.  Their 
concerns are hard to ignore, coming from well-established mainstream economists, published 
under the auspices of the World Bank, and directed in part at the heart of development 
economics – the economic growth literature. 
Fundamental to their critique are the notions of exchangeability and parameter 
heterogeneity. In relation to assumptions of homogeneity of entities in their particular 
domain of analysis – economic growth models - they assert that it is simply implausible to 
believe that the determinants of economic growth are identical across countries: ‘Does it 
really make sense to believe that a change in the level of a civil liberties index has the same 
effect on growth in the United States as in the Russian Federation?’  In the spirit outlined 
above, they do not deny that statistical advances – in this case, panel data fixed effects – 
mitigates some particular aspects, but such advances do not address the ‘more general 
question’.  Again, they do not want us to throw the inferential baby out with the statistical 
bathwater, but they believe that the assumption of parameter homogeneity underlying linear 
statistical methods ‘is particularly inappropriate in studying complex heterogenous objects, 
such as countries’.   
The assumption of parameter homogeneity is, for Brock and Durlauf, one manifestation of a 
broader problem of statistical inference – the assumption of exchangeability.  Brock and 
Durlauf provide a formal definition and discussion of exchangeability in mathematical terms, 
but the idea is powerfully simple.  The requirement of exchangeability is that once we have 
held for the explanatory factors we include in our analysis, ‘no basis exists for distinguishing 
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the probabilities of various permutations of residual components in country-level growth’.  If 
we have an extensive set of regressors that significantly explain economic growth, we should 
have no a priori reason for expecting the error on a particular observation to go one way or 
the other, to be small or large.  Yet on any set of historical growth regressions, most 
economists would expect Japan to be a positive outlier.  Japan is not exchangeable with other 
countries.   
There is a clear Bayesian dimension to this logic: the inferences we draw from our growth 
regressions must be compared against our prior knowledge of, for instance, Japan as a country 
that has experienced exceptional growth or, as Brock and Durlauf also discuss in relation to 
Easterly and Levine’s (1996) account of ethnic heterogeneity and growth retardation, much 
of Sub-Saharan Africa as likely negative outliers.  
Brock and Durlauf do not see themselves as delivering a knock-out punch to linear analysis 
but rather as providing an avenue for new and fruitful research.  Where the standard errors 
of our models conform to our prior expectation and hence violate the exchangeability 
requirement, this is not grounds to reject our inferences but is rather grounds for further 
enquiry.  Hence, for instance, in replicating Easterly and Levine, Brock and Durlauf find that 
‘the operation of ethnic heterogeneity on growth is different in Africa, not just the levels of 
ethnic heterogeneity’.  But this does not lead them to reject the finding, but to ‘suggest a 
direction along which to extend their research. Our results illustrate how additional insights 
can be obtained by explicitly controlling for model uncertainty’.  We can draw an instructive 
parallel here with the approach of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol above.  Paying little attention 
to the differing coefficient sizes in their models, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol take the 
consistent statistical significance as evidence of the ‘robustness’ of their analysis and hence, 
implicitly, of the linearity of underlying effects across all cases.  Looked at again through Brock 
and Durlauf’s lenses, however, their findings suggest an alternative interpretation: that there 
is parameter heterogeneity; that by implication there is not a consistent linear effect across 
all cases; and that, therefore, more work remains to be done.  Again, this is not throwing out 
the usefulness of linear analysis, but is showing how careful attention to the homogeneity of 
entities and parameters can both usefully delimit the extent of its applicability and point to 
new and interesting avenues of research. 
Brock and Durlauf propose a methodology that allows us to explore the limits of linearity ‘from 
within’.  A second statistical phenomenon that helps us do this is heteroscedasticity.  As we 
shall see, however, treatments of heteroscedasticity are more often than not geared toward 
‘explaining away’ rather than embracing its potential to aid carefully delimited linear analysis.   
Heteroscadisticity can be understood as a particular type of heterogeneity in parameter 
estimates, where the size of the individual error term is correlated with one or more predictor 
variable(see, e.g., Phillips and Xu, 2005). Typically, however, such attention is tuned towards 
finding for efficient estimators or ‘correcting’ for heteroscedastic variation in standard errors.  
While this may be appropriate in certain contexts, in other contexts the presence of 
heteroscedasticity may be taken precisely as an indicator of the limits of linearity.   
Consider a standard textbook example of heteroscedasticity: the relationship between 
income and consumption.  At lower levels of income, the relationship between income and 
consumption is typically quite close (standard errors are small) as people on low income have 
little disposable income to save (so consumption does not fall far below income) and little 
access to credit (so consumption does not exceed income substantially).  At higher levels of 
income, however, the standard errors are much high – individuals with higher income exhibit 
much greater variation in their saving and borrowing behaviour.   
In the standard econometric manuals (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2013: Ch.8), heteroscedasticity 
is treated as a ‘technical’ problem that can (and should) be ‘corrected’ for either through 
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manipulation of the data (through, for instance, using a log transformation) or, if that fails, 
using heteroscedasticity-robust statistics.  Because, from this perspective, the issue at stake 
is the distribution of standard errors rather than the coefficient, ‘correcting’ for 
heteroscedasticity does not change the point prediction for an observation with an unknown 
left-hand side, but it does affect the confidence interval.  In our textbook example, correcting 
for heteroscedasticity would generate the same predicted consumption based on an 
individual’s income, but would have a wider confidence interval (potentially beyond the 
normal range of statistical significance).   
Is this reasonable?  On the one hand, it might be argued that heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors give us a more plausible prediction (or, to be more precise, predicted range) 
of consumption at higher levels of income than would be implied by OLS estimation.  But by 
the same token, it is giving us a less precise prediction of consumption at lower levels of 
income than we might reasonably expect given the data.  If we were to partition the data – 
albeit at some arbitrary point – we could plausibly find a strong, significant and homoscedastic 
relationship between income and consumption in the lower partition and a weak or even 
statistically absent relationship in the upper partition.   
The point here, necessarily dusted with cautionary scare quotes, is that ‘standard’ procedures 
for ‘correcting’ for heteroscedasticity appear to be primarily motivated by a desire to ‘deal’ 
with what is perceived as a ‘technical problem’ – the parallel with Stolzenberg’s language is 
telling.  Our assertion is that heteroscedasticity may, rather, tell us something more 
fundamental about our data and the limits of linear inference.  The former behaviour is 
consistent with an epistemology-dependent ontology; the latter position more critical.  Put in 
more prosaic language, heteroscedasticity in the education-income relationship tells us that 
there is something fundamentally different going on in the determinants of income at higher 
levels of education than at lower levels.  Why, then, would we want to ‘correct’ for this just 
to maintain the illusion of a consistent linear relationship across the entire domain?   
B. Insignificantly-Interacting Entities 
Let us return to our basic description of linear analysis: a set of homogenous entities 
(observations) characterized by different attributes and consistent causal relationships 
between dependent and independent attributes.  One of the fundamental assumptions that 
undergird linear statistical techniques is the independence of observations.  One implication 
of this is that the relationship between independent and dependent variables acts separately 
but consistently on the different observations and that effect on one observation is not 
affected by the effect on another observation.  Variable might interact; observations do not. 
Clearly, at the most basic level, this is not a great description of the social world.  Individuals, 
companies, countries do not operate in a vacuum, isolated from each other. Moreover, we 
might note that this assumption sits at odds with much formal modeling in economics and, 
increasingly, other social sciences that seek to model the behaviour of interacting agents 
relative to their position within a particular system.  This interaction might be direct – as in 
the classic principal-agent dilemma – or indirect – as in the account of urban segregation 
dynamics in Schelling’s model. 
But we might reasonably assert that at the macroscopic level, these influences counteract 
each other randomly, allowing us to identify clear signals with linear analysis; this would be 
the line taken by Goldthorpe, for instance.  But how far can we push this assumption? 
Let us return to the education-income relationship.  Across an entire economy, we might 
reasonably assert such a simplifying assumption.  But within a particular economy … 
There is a clear link here with the issue of homogeneity of entities.  When we cannot assume 
homogenous entities – where, in Brock and Durlauf’s terminology, we lack ‘exchangeability’ – 
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this is often precisely because the actions of one or more entities are likely to have a significant 
effect on other entities.  Consider, for instance, the extensive quantitative literature on the 
determinants of democratization (e.g. Hegre et al. 2001).  Using historical datasets, this 
literature has sought to identify the geopolitical and economic characteristics of countries that 
tend to lead to democratization.  But these countries do not interact.  Is this plausible?   
The Arab Spring saw a wave of regime change – some permanent, some reversed, some 
wholly unfinished – across the Middle East and North Africa.  Statistically, many of these 
countries were negative outliers – they were ripe for democratization.  In this sense, the Arab 
Spring could be seen as conforming to a linear account of democratization.  But the timing of 
the revolutions can hardly be taken as independent or coincidental.  Likewise, the fall of the 
Berlin Wall had clear and direct demonstrative effects on other authoritarian regimes in 
Eastern Europe.  Moreover, all of these transitions were enabled by Gorbachev’s repudiation 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine as part of the partial democratization of the Soviet Union under his 
leadership.  Indeed, the wider literature on democratization is concerned with the ‘waves’ 
with which democratization has occurred (see, e.g. Huntington 1986) – phenomena that 
cannot be explained with simple linear models.  
As above, we can note that there are plenty of statistical techniques that allow us to ‘correct’ 
for this to some extent, notably spatial autoregression techniques to hold for geographical 
‘neighbourhood effects’ (see, e.g. Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Ward and Gleditsch 2008) and 
for more abstract ‘spatial’ relationships such as trade connections (see Beck, Gleditsch, and 
Beardsley 2006).  But while these might account to some degree for spatial and temporal 
‘clustering’, they retain the assumption that interactions between individual observations are 
smoothed out in a linear way. 
Consider, for instance, the effect of ‘special cases’ in democratization processes.  Spatial 
clustering may appear to account for the wave of democratization in Eastern Europe at the 
end of the Cold War period, but these were predicated, quite specifically, on the actions of 
the Soviet Union qua the Soviet Union, not as an indistinguishable (but powerful) ‘neighbour’.  
Thinking counterfactually, had Russia taken a path towards more consolidated and 
competitive democracy in the post-Soviet era than it did, it seems implausible to assert that 
this would not have had dramatic effects on the other post-Soviet states.  But could one make 
the same claim about Belarus? Again, one might seek to hold for this by adjusting 
autoregressive geographical weights to hold for some measure of regional power or 
‘hegemony’.  But this increasingly smacks not so much of ‘theory-saving’ as ‘method-saving’.  
The point here is Brock and Durlauf redux: in accounting for democratization in Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union lacks ‘exchangeability’ with other observations, even in 
geographically-weighted analysis.  The implications of violation of this condition, however, are 
far stronger when we consider interacting agents than when we consider parameter 
homogeneity on its own.  Brock and Durlauf show how we can begin to delimit an appropriate 
realm for linear analysis by excluding (or partitioning) cases where residuals are systematically 
and ex ante predictably extreme.  But they if we have reason to believe that the interaction 
of those ‘unexchangeable’ cases with the remaining cases affects outcomes in the remaining 
cases, exclusion or partitioning may no longer be sufficient. 
Moreover, even in the absence of ‘special cases’ that interact significantly with other 
observations and skew their behaviour accordingly, there are other conditions under which 
interacting agents can affect the linearity of outcomes in ways that are not so identifiable ex 
ante.  Evolutionary modeling and complexity literature points to the importance of runaway 
‘feedback loops’ that can produce dramatic macroscopic effects from the interactions of 
apparently ‘unspecial’ cases.  The rise of ethnic Chinese wealth in much of Southeast Asia and 
ethnic Lebanese wealth in much of West Africa are examples of such processes.  Ex ante, there 
would have been no particular reason to pick these groups out as separate from other groups 
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in their likelihood to gain the dominant positions in the local economy that they have.  It was 
the particular nature of the interactions between Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia that 
enabled them to gain the economic advantage that they did (see, e.g. Tagliacozzo and Chang 
2011).   
We have seen, then, that the assumptions of linear analysis are problematic in domains where 
we can reasonably expect interactions between observations to have significant impacts upon 
individual outcomes.  Where these interactions are random noise – in the sense that they 
counteract each other at the macroscopic level – linear analysis of the system may still be 
appropriate and useful.  But we have identified two conditions where this seems more 
problematic: where we have good reason to believe that ‘special cases’ determine the 
outcome of other cases in a non-symmetrical way; and, where feedback loops among ‘non-
special cases’ may generate runaway macroscopic effects.  The former of these is clearly 
linked to the first of our conditions, that of homogeneity of parameter effects – special cases 
violate this.  The latter of these links to our third condition, that of a stable and consistent 
context.  It is to this that we now turn. 
C. Stable and Closed Context 
[incomplete] 
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